Referee issues decision on garage lawsuit fees and costs

When the court dismissed the garage lawsuit last summer, the judge ordered that the plaintiffs pay reasonable fees and costs incurred by the co-op in defending the suit.  Over the next few months the parties submitted arguments to a referee regarding how much the plaintiffs should have to pay.

On December 22, the referee recommended that the court award the co-op $161,088.72 in fees and costs.  We assume the court will adopt this recommendation.

It is not yet clear to us, however, how the amount already paid by one of the five plaintiffs (who settled with the co-op a few months ago for his share of the fees that were accrued at that time) will factor into this, or whether the co-op will receive any discount from our lawyers for the portion of the fees and expenses billed that the referee decided were not “reasonable” (although the lawyers are certain to disagree with that decision).

Regardless, it is highly likely that each of the remaining four plaintiffs is likely to have an extra $40k (give or take) line item on their maintenance bill in the near future, which should serve as a cautionary tale to any other shareholder who is considering suing the co-op without a really solid case.

Anti-Valet Lawsuit Decided in Co-op’s Favor

Hon. Arthur F. Engoron of the New York State Supreme Court yesterday issued a Decision and Order in favor of the co-op on all points.

The Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ lawsuit and denied their motion for sanctions, and said that the co-op is entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees from the plaintiffs (although the amount to be recovered still has to be decided separately).

You can read the full Decision and Order, which knocks down pretty much every argument the plaintiffs tried to throw at the proverbial wall.

But perhaps most instructive for certain members of our co-op community, who seem to feel that every significant decision should be put to a shareholder vote, is the following:

As a matter of public policy, the Board was under no contractual, legal, or equitable duty to involve more than 1,700 cooperators in its decision-making process.  Rather, the Board was elected specifically to conduct the day-to-day affairs of the co-op and to take entire charge of the property, interests, business, and transactions of the co-op.  It would be nearly impossible for co-op boards to function if every time they had to act, they had to entertain potentially endless debate involving numerous varying positions.

Suing Seward: What Could Happen?

Executive summary:  A few shareholders are threatening to sue our  co-op to try to invalidate the Icon parking contract.  We think they have a very low likelihood of success, but even if they fail it will cost every shareholder something to defend the lawsuit.  And in the unlikely worst case scenario where they succeed and get the contract invalidated, there is a decent likelihood that Icon would sue for breach of contract, which could cost – our  co-op (and by extension, every shareholder) serious money.

Two websites reported last week that attorney Ezra Glaser has been hired by a small group of shareholders led by Don West to sue the co-op over the garage conversion.  It is unclear exactly what legal claims Mr. Glaser intends to bring, but he spoke quite a bit at one open meeting about Article 78 proceedings, and at the most recent meeting he said his ultimate goal is to invalidate the co-op’s contract with Icon.

Will Mr. Glaser succeed?  What exactly happens if he does?  And who pays for the consequences?

The Spark does not (and in our opinion should not) have access to the Icon contract.  Without it, and without having seen any actual legal complaint from Mr. Glaser, we are somewhat limited in our ability to provide analysis.  But based on what the Board has publicly communicated, and what Mr. Glaser has said in Don West’s open meetings, we can make some educated guesses.  Please note that although the author of this post is an attorney, this post is for general interest informational purposes only; it does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied upon by any party.

What is the likelihood of success?

In short: extremely low.  As a general rule, courts give wide deference to the board of a corporation (do a Google search of “business judgment rule” for more background).  Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules allows a court to review the Board’s decision and potentially invalidate it if it was “arbitrary and capricious” or if they failed to follow their own rules and procedures.  But it very hard for us to see how a decision that has clear benefits for the co-op as a whole (reducing the waiting list, making more money, getting more shareholders access to the parking garage that they own) and very limited adverse effects (existing garage tenants lose park-and-lock convenience, but keep access to the garage for the same price as before) could possibly be viewed by an objective outsider as “arbitrary and capricious.”  And by all accounts, the Board performed due diligence and held a series of meetings where they discussed and voted multiple times to proceed with the garage conversion.  Separate votes to hire a parking consultant, issue an RFP to operators, and select Icon were all unanimous (except for those absent from the applicable meetings).  The vote to enter into the final contract was 6-5 in favor.

What are the consequences if the lawsuit succeeds?

In the unlikely event that a court declares the Icon contract invalid, it would be up to the Board to determine what to do next in terms of how the garage would be operated going forward.  There is no guarantee that everything would go back to how it was the day before the contract went into effect.  And there is also a strong likelihood that Icon would sue the co-op for breach of their 10 year contract.  Such a lawsuit could be extremely costly to the co-op.

Who pays for everything?

Mr. Glaser’s attorney fees are between him and his clients.  But assuming he brings a suit, the co-op will at minimum have to pay attorneys to defend it, even if the case is thrown out like some of Mr. West’s previous lawsuits against the co-op.  That cost will fall on all ~1700 households in our co-op.

In the worst case scenario, where a court actually invalidates the Icon contract, Icon sues, and Icon is awarded millions of dollars in damages, every shareholder will be hit with the consequences.  The irony here, of course, is that Don West and any other shareholder who signs on as a plaintiff in this lawsuit is likely to be harmed more if the lawsuit succeeds than if it fails.

Initial Reactions to the 2015 Financial Statements

On a quick initial read of the financial statements that were delivered to shareholders’ doors today, a few things jumped out.

The bad:

  • We have disturbingly little operating cash.  At 11/30/15, we had just over $100k in operating cash (with almost $3MM in outstanding payables).  This is far worse than previous years.
  • After last year’s big write-off, commercial tenants’ arrears have already started creeping back up (up another $100k from last year).
  • Flip tax collections were down over $1MM vs. 2014.

The good:

  • Heating costs are down, so it looks like the boilers are paying off.  There’s also a note that they are fully paid off.
  • Security costs are down, so it looks like bringing security in-house is paying off.
  • In the notes, it is revealed that the base rent Icon pays for the garage is $1.08MM per year, which is more than $200k more than the total garage charges we collected from shareholders in 2015.  So even ignoring any costs that are being shifted to Icon (like maintenance/repairs for the gates that are always breaking), the co-op is immediately making more money from this arrangement than from the old arrangement.  And based on the note, it sounds like there is the possibility for us to share in additional revenue under unknown circumstances.

The good and bad:

  • The long-running public-adjuster lawsuit was finally settled for $950k.  This seems like a lot of money to pay to someone for failing at his job, but we had fought it for many years and the latest rounds in court had not gone our way.  At least it’s done and we’re not paying lawyers to continue fighting it.

Garage Communications Timeline

A contributor provided the timeline below summarizing official communications that the Board and Management sent to shareholders regarding the conversion of the parking garage.  We have included relevant excerpts from some communications and links to the full versions of others.

December 8 – Report from the Boardroom Issued by Aaron Lee Fineman, Secretary:

The Board voted to hire a parking consultant to explore the feasibility of expanding all parking options throughout the coop. No decisions regarding any changes to the garage or its operation have been made yet. As part of the evaluation of utilization options, the Board voted to approve the issuance of an RFP for potential garage operators.

January 28 – Board Memo Regarding Parking (announcing the change, expected to take effect on March 1)

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Valet Parking is the Right Move

The Board announced last week that they are in negotiations with a parking operator to switch the parking garage from its current approximately 388 capacity self-parking configuration to a valet system that will accommodate approximately 40% more vehicles.

There has been a predictable uproar from those who currently have parking spaces in the garage.  We are sympathetic to their concerns, as most of them waited a pretty long time to get a spot in the garage, and they will almost certainly suffer a very real loss of convenience as a result of the change.  Ultimately, however, we strongly support the Board’s decision to make this change.

The garage currently can be used by less than 25% of shareholders, most of whom waited 8 years or less to obtain a parking space.  But the wait has shot up in recent years.  The last shareholder to receive a spot waited over 12 years, and there are over 200 shareholders on the waiting list who have already waited more than 8 years.  That means that every single shareholder who will be offered a parking spot as a result of this change has already waited longer than most shareholders who currently enjoy parking privileges.

And based on recent rates of turnover in the garage, a shareholder who signs up today can expect to wait something like 25 years for a parking space.  The impetus for the change isn’t that newer shareholders aren’t willing to wait their turn, as some have suggested.  Newer shareholders are just as willing to wait as those who got here earlier, but they would like to have a turn at some point during their lifetimes.

Indoor reserved self-parking is also a luxury that is virtually unheard of in Manhattan.  We are not aware of a single other market-rate co-op, condo or rental building in Manhattan that has indoor reserved self-parking, let alone at prices that are significantly discounted compared to far less convenient nearby commercial options.  It strikes us as quite unfair to ask that this luxury be preserved for the benefit of 388 shareholders who happened to sign up for parking prior to 2003 or so, when there are 662 other shareholders who want a parking space, many of whom have already waited longer than most of the 388 privileged shareholders did.

A valet system that keeps costs from rising but allows significantly more shareholders to access the amenity, and brings the expected wait for new shareholders closer to historical averages, strikes us as a very sensible and cooperatively minded move. We applaud the Board for having the courage to do it, and we thank the shareholders with existing parking spots who will be sacrificing some convenience to enable more widespread sharing of our communal resources.

 

Extrapolating Expected Garage Wait Times

Aside

We have said that (absent an expansion of garage capacity) a shareholder signing up for the garage waiting list today for the first time can expect to wait something like 25 years to get a parking spot.

That figure is based on comparing the 9/6/11 waiting list (which we have a copy of) with the latest 1/6/16 list.

#1 as of 1/6/16 was #68 as of 9/6/11.
#68 now was #142 then.
#142 now was #239 then.
#239 now was #352 then.
#352 now was #519 then.
#519 now didn’t sign up for the list until almost two years after 9/6/11.

1,583 days elapsed between the two lists.

If you assume the same rate of turnover between each of these points on the list holds true, the current #519 (who had already waited 2.5 years as of 1/6/16) will have to wait 5x 1583 days (or almost 22 more years) to reach #1, at which point that shareholder will have waited over  25 years.

The last shareholder on the 1/6/16 list was #661, and that shareholder can probably expect another 4-5 years beyond #519’s expected wait, for a total of well over 25 years.